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The purpose of this research was to investigate the
problems surrounding the Marine Integrated Fire and Air
Support System (MIFASS) Program, managed by the United




Defining what MIFASS was and the program management
structure supporting the program and
2) Analyzing the problems of a flawed acquisition
strategy, flawed requirements definition, and a
flawed program management structure.
As a result of this analysis this paper concludes the
need for establishing a "Marine Corps Systems Command" out
2
of which C programs may be supported, and the opening of a
program management office for the acquisition of complex C
systems.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. AREA OF RESEARCH
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the program
2
management of a major command and control (C ) system for
the U.S. Marine Corps called the Marine Integrated Fire and
Air Support System (MIFASS). The acquisition of MIFASS was
initiated by a 1975 Marine Corps Required Operational
Capability (ROC). Due to problems which caused serious cost
overruns and schedule delays, General P. X. Kelley,
Commandant of the Marine Corps, recommended to the Secretary
of the Navy in June 1987, that the MIFASS program be
terminated.
B. DISCUSSION
Only under certain circumstances will the Commandant of
the Marine Corps (CMC) authorize the formation of a Marine
Corps program management office (PMO), with a senior Marine
Officer or DOD civilian chartered with ultimate program
responsibility as the program manager (PM). This was not
the case from the inception of MIFASS. Program management
and direction was accomplished using an informal matrix
organized from departments within Headquarters Marine Corps
(HQMC), the Marine Corps Development Center (DevCtr), and
the Navy Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR).
C. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The main objectives of this thesis are as follows:
1. Analyze the management aspects related to why the
Marine Corps had difficulties in developing MIFASS.
2. Provide broad conclusions about how management
problems with the MIFASS program could have been
avoided.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is:
What has been the acquisition strategy for MIFASS and what
implications has this strategy had for its program
management?
Subsidiary questions are:
1. What was the initial management philosophy at the
inception of MIFASS.
2. Given the required structure of the DOD acquisition
process, how were the issues of program management
treated as MIFASS evolved.
3. What C program management lessons can be learned from
examining the MIFASS program.
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The basic research for this thesis was developed from a
comprehensive study of Navy and Marine Corps documents and
from interviews with the following:
1. Members of the MIFASS Acquisition Coordinating Group
( ACG )
.
2. Staff of the Marine Corps Systems Program Directorate
at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
(SPAWAR)
.
3. Mr. Paul Mcllvaine, Director of the Technical
Management Department, Defense Systems Management
College (DSMC).
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This thesis topic was selected on the basis of
recommendations by Major Jim Haney, USMC, and Captain Larry
-a
Lane, USMC, both located at the C° Division, Marine Corps
Development Center, Quantico, Virginia. These recommenda-
tions were based on serious problems that MIFASS had
experienced, and that a "lessons learned" type study would
be useful to the Marine Corps.
F. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
The general direction of the thesis is to provide
broad background information about how MIFASS was managed,
and to analyze key decisions that were made in regards to
MIFASS development. With this information in mind, general
conclusions are made to apply lessons learned and to help
2avoid problems with future C acquisitions.
G. DEFINITIONS
For the purpose of this study, the following definitions
are provided:
1. Acquisition Strategy—Strategy to satisfy an approved
mission need that is the conceptual basis of the
overall plan that a program manager follows in program
execution. It should be structured at the outset of
the program to provide an organized and consistent
approach to meeting program objectives within known
constraints [Ref. l:p. III-l]
.
2. Specifications (Specs) --The detailed descriptions of
materials, parts, and components used in making a
product.
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3. Justification for System New Start—Program initiation
document required for all Marine Corps programs which
have a concept exploration phase in which the
projected research, development, test, and evaluation
costs are projected to be less than $200 million [Ref.
2:p. B-18]
.
4. Milestones ( M. S .) --Critical points of time where
decisions to continue on with a program are made.
a. M.S. I (1974) for MIFASS was passed after a
successful concept exploration phase and the
decision was made to begin the demonstration and
validation phase.
b. M.S. II (1979) marked the beginning of the full
scale development phase for MIFASS. The
engineering development phase for MIFASS began at
this point.
c. M.S. Ill (1987) normally marks the approval or
disapproval for unlimited or limited production.
MIFASS was terminated at the M.S. Ill review.
[Ref. 2:pp. II-42-II-50]
5. Marine Systems Acquisition Review Council (MSARC)--
This group conducts milestone reviews. The MSARC
committee is chaired by the Acquisition Program
Sponsor. [Ref. 2:p. IX-32]
6. Acquisition Category ( ACAT ) --There are four basic
categories of acquisition programs. Programs are
categorized on the basis of development risks,
urgency, congressional interest, joint service
involvement, and resource requirements. Because
MIFASS was initially programmed for Research,
Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) of under
$100 million and over $20 million, it was designated
as an ACAT lie, with CMC acting as the decision
authority. [Ref. 2:pp. II-6-7]
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II provides information on exactly what MIFASS
was supposed to be, how it related to other systems, and how
the Marine Corps established an organization to manage its
development. Chapter III analyzes key problems experienced
12
by the Marine Corps while establishing what it wanted in the
form of MIFASS, and the difficulties in attaining these
goals as a result of certain program management flaws.
Chapter IV provides a detailed discussion on the flawed
MIFASS matrix organization. Chapter V draws conclusions on
how the MIFASS program should have been organized.
13
II. MIFASS SYSTEM
A. WHAT WAS MIFASS?
MIFASS was conceived in the 1960 's as a combination of
equipment, personnel, and associated procedures that
together were to provide the means for exercising command
2
and control (C ) of fire and air support assets within a
Marine landing force. As a system MIFASS was to perform
these tasks within a larger architecture called the Marine
Tactical Command and Control System (MTACCS). MTACCS was a
conceptual association of C systems to support tactical
operations in the 1990 's. The primary goal of MTACCS was to
provide Marine commanders in the field the C capability to
assist in countering an expected threat. To attain this
objective, the selective automation of various C functions
was planned for command levels where they were to be
"operationally desirable and logistically supportable."
[Ref. 3:p. 1-3]
There were seven functions to be performed within
MTACCS architecture, they were: fire and close air support,
air operations, ground operations, intelligence, personnel,
position location information, and analysis and evaluation.
MIFASS pertained "to the integrated coordination of fire and
air support of ground elements" [Ref. 3:p. 1-4]. MIFASS was
to provide support in the immediate attack of targets of
14
opportunity and to give automated assistance in fire
planning, target intelligence, counterfire operations,
nuclear and biological target analysis, forward area air
defense, mission activity reporting and low altitude air
space management.
MIFASS centers were to be located at various levels
within the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to act as
the primary command and control agencies for all supporting
arms. Suites of equipment (computers and display devices)
were to be constructed around a set of software modules to
enable a complete set of system capabilities. [Ref. 3:p. I-
5] MIFASS software was originally designed to provide
automation to assist the MAGTF in operating within a new
tactical doctrine implemented by a system of fire and air
support centers (FASC). The FASC concept was to reorganize
and centralize the C mission changing from what was the
current doctrine which specified a decentralized mode of
operation doctrine. FASCs were to "assume the functions of
the Marine Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC), Direct
Air Support Center (DASC), and selected roles of supporting
artillery and naval gunfire assets assigned the mission of
direct support" (Ref. 3:p. II-2]
.
Within MTACCS and the FASC concept, MIFASS was designed
to operate directly or indirectly with six other MTACCS
systems (see Appendix A):
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1. Tactical Air Operations Central 1985 (TAOC-85)
2. Tactical Combat Operations ( TCO
)
3. Marine Air Ground Intelligence Systems (MAGIS)
4. Marine Integrated Personnel Systems (MIPS)
5. Position Location Reporting Systems ( PLRS
)
6. Tactical Warfare Simulation, Evaluation, and Analysis
Systems (TWSEAS)
The Marine Corps had for the first time, singly taken on
the development of a unique, ambitious, and extremely
complex C system. By 1982 these six MTACCS subsystems,
along with MIFASS, were either deleted, or had their
functions combined. The resulting program consisted of the
Tactical Air Operations Module (TAOM, which was also later
deferred), the Position Location Reporting System (PLRS),
and MIFASS [Ref . 4] .
B. MIFASS ACQUISITION AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
The program management of MIFASS within MTACCS, was
accomplished through a decentralized assemblage of personnel
and offices from Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), the Space
and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), Marine Corps
Installations and Logistics (I&L, technically part of HQMC),
and the Marine Corps Development Center ( DevCtr ) . (see Appendix B
1. HQMC Staff
The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) was
authorized to make the final Acquisition Category lie (ACAT
lie) recommendation for MIFASS to the Secretary of the Navy.
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When the MIFASS program was determined untenable, he made
the ultimate recommendation in May 1987, to terminate the
program [Ref. 4].
The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC)
was designated as the Acquisition Executive (AE). As the
AE, he was required to monitor and control the acquisition
management of MIFASS and to report to CMC. The AE had the
decision authority on MIFASS acquisition policy, and
ultimately was the person who recommended to CMC that MIFASS
be terminated.
The ACMC chaired an ad hoc group of selected general
officers called the ACMC committee. The purpose of this
committee was to act as a program review body, and not as a
milestone review. As problems with MIFASS schedule
deadlines and cost overruns became more serious, the ACMC
committee met frequently, and assumed many of the
responsibilities previously held by the Acquisition Program
Sponsor (APS) [Ref. 4].
The next agencies in the chain of acquisition
management for MIFASS were the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Research, Development, and Studies (DC/S RD&S ) , and the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics (DC/S
I&L).
The DC/S RD&S acted as the principle executive
officer (PEO) for MIFASS development up to the Milestone III
17
decision point. With regards to MIFASS, DC/S RD&S had the
following major responsibilities:
a. Coordinating the staff review and approval of all
MIFASS program initiation requirement documents.
b. Directing, supervising, coordinating, and monitoring
MIFASS to ensure a logical link between mission needs,
research development test and evaluation ( RDT&E ) , and
procurement.
c. Preparing MIFASS acquisition decision memorandums
(ADMs) for submission to CMC.
d. Coordinating with the APS ensuring program
documentation was complete.
e. Coordinating the conduct of testing and evaluation of
MIFASS (The director of the Marine Corps Operational
Test and Evaluation Activities, MCOTEA, was
responsible for independent test and evaluation of
MIFASS)
.
f. Providing the development coordinator (DC) to the
acquisition coordinating group (ACG).
g. Coordinating acquisition of MIFASS with DC/S I&L to
facilitate the conduct of logistics support analyses
(LSAs) and integrated logistics support plans (ILSPs)
[Ref. 2:pp. III-8-9].
The DC/S I&L would have been the PEO for the AE had
MIFASS reached the production and deployment phase. His
major responsibilities were:
a. Initiating planning for ILSPs early in the development
phase.
b. Coordinating the ILSPs up to Milestone III.
c. Conducting LSAs and ILSPs as soon as possible after
the MIFASS program initiation.
d. Providing the acquisition project officer (APO), who




e. Ensuring that reliability, availability, maintain-
ability, and quality assurance considerations were
given appropriate emphasis during MIFASS development.
[Ref. 2:p. 11-10]
Also located below the ACMC, but maintaining a
division status, was the Acquisition Program Sponsor (APS),
Director, Command, Control, Communications, and Computer
Systems Divisions ( DirC SysDiv ) . His purpose was to act as
APS for all ground tactical command, control, and
communications systems, of which MIFASS was included. He
was to ensure "the interoperability, intraoperability
,
compatibility, and the interface" of MIFASS with associated
communication equipment in the Marine Corps. [Ref. 2:p.
11-14] He was also a reviewer on all proposed program
initiations, and requirements involved with MIFASS. His
major responsibilities also included:
a. Acting as the principal Marine Corps point of contact
for providing management and planning guidance for
MIFASS.
b. Assessing the capabilities, suitability, and cost
effectiveness of the system throughout the life cycle
of the program (technology risks, program tailoring,
ILS, personnel and training requirements, etc.).
c. Providing the MIFASS acquisition sponsor project
officer (ASPO), who is a member of the acquisition
coordinating group (ACG).
d. Initiating the mission area analysis for MIFASS to
determine operational requirements. [Ref. 2: pp. II-
16-18]
2. The Marine Corps Development Center
The Director of the Marine Corps Development Center
(DirDevCtr) came under the staff cognizance of the DC/S RD&S
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during MIFASS development. This relationship was not a
command relationship, but as a provider of updates on the
status of the hardware and software development of MIFASS.
His major responsibilities for MIFASS included:
a. Managing the Marine Corps Long Range Studies Program
that generated a need for MIFASS.
b. Preparing and submitting program initiation and
requirement documents to DC/S RD&S for HQMC staffing.
c. Conducting mission area analyses as requested by the
APS.
d. Acting as the single Marine Corps agency responsible
for the management of the work performed by the MIFASS
principle development activity (PDA), and associated
contractors related to development, systems
engineering, and test and evaluation.
e. Providing the MIFASS development project officer
(DPO), who is a member of the acquisition coordinating
group (ACG). [Ref. 2:pp. 11-19-20]
3 . The Acquisition Coordinating Group (ACG)
Out of the structure formed by HQMC and the
DirDevCtr, was formed the ACG. This body consisted of a
committee of action officer representatives from each of
the mentioned agencies. "The members of the ACG [had]
responsibilities that [resulted] both in the collective
program management using the authority of the APS, and the
billet related responsibilities" within one of these
agencies [Ref. 2:p. III-4]
.
Collectively the ACG had several functions within
the MIFASS program:
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a. Write and execute the acquisition strategy plan (ASP)
and the material acquisition process (MAP).
b. Coordinate the actions of its members in meeting
program management requirements.
c. Exchange information among ACG members.
d. Document program history.
e. Review program management decisions.
f. Recommend program management actions to the APS.
[Ref. 2:p. III-3]
The leading member of the ACG was the acquisition
sponsor project officer (ASPO). He was the action officer
from C Division who had the systems acquisition
responsibility for MIFASS. His primary duties included:
a. Coordinating staff action for the APS pertaining to
the MIFASS impact on Marine Corps force structure and
training.
b. Ensuring that the Justification for System New Start
( JSNS ) , the Required Operational Capability (ROC), and
the Life Cycle Cost Forecast (LCCF) were accurate
before submission to HQMC.
c. Developing the MIFASS ASP, MAP and Manpower Training
Plan (MTP) with the ACG's assistance.
d. Preparing the program objective memorandum (POM)
initiation with the ACG's assistance.
e. Producing written minutes for every ACG meeting.
f. Providing program action recommendations resulting
from the ACG meetings, to the APS for approval.
[Ref. 2:p. III-7]
The second key member of the ACG was the development
project officer (DPO). He was the action officer from the
DevCtr who was "responsible to the ACG for the day to day
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management of the development program" for MIFASS. [Ref.
2:p. 111-10] . His principle responsibilities during the
MIFASS program were:
a. To act as the single Marine Corps point of contact up
to Milestone III, for tasking the project management
echelon of the assigned PDA (Program Directorate 70-
42, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command).
b. Prepare RDT&E work directives to explicitly identify
deliverable products, required completion dates, and
acceptance authority for MIFASS.
c. Prepare statements of work (SOW's) that specified
MIFASS task elements to be performed, acceptance
procedures, and required delivery dates.
d. Preparing function documents for MIFASS.
e. Providing periodic program review briefings to HQMC
agencies that addressed program costs, schedule, and
technical performance, as well as program
documentation and expenditure rates.
f. Reporting to the ACG all significant results of
conferences, meetings or reviews that applied to the
program. [Ref. 2:p. III-ll]
A third key figure of the ACG was the Acquisition
Project Officer ( APO ) . The APO was a member of the staff
of DC/S I&L who was "responsible for the management of the
logistical, technical, and engineering aspects of
production, fielding, operations, support, and retirement"
of MIFASS [Ref. 2:p. III-9] (Because MIFASS was terminated,
the APO provided all the logistical support planning, in
anticipation of production).
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The APO ' s major responsibilities included:
a. Developing the ILSP for MIFASS.
b. Considering LSA's for MIFASS.
c. Assisting the ASPO and DPO in developing LCCF data to
support program initiation and documentation.
d. Influencing development efforts to ensure that
reliability, maintainability, supportability , and
other logistic requirements were incorporated into the
system design.
e. Assisting the ASPO in the programming of funds.
f. Identifying and managing data requirements and
delivery during the life cycle of the system.
g. Acting as the single point of contact after Milestone
III for tasking the project management echelon of the
PDA (Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command). [Ref.
2:p. III-9]
The fourth major participant within the ACG was the
development coordinator (DC). He was a member of the DC/S
RD&S staff who was assigned to coordinate the MIFASS
acquisition program [Ref. 2:p. III-9] . His major responsi-
bilities for the MIFASS program were:
a. Maintaining the master project file as a historical
reference of development efforts for MIFASS. He acted
as the ACG's expert concerning the system acquisition
process, and simultaneously monitored the program for
the DC/S RD&S.
b. Assisting the ASPO in preparing the ASP and MAP.
c. Coordinating the staffing and approval for the MIFASS
program initiation.
d. Assisting the ASPO in programming the RDT&E funds for
executing the development plan. [Ref. 2:p. III-9-10]
The DC along with the ASPO, DPO, and APO were the
four most important members of the ACG. Other departments
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within HQMC provided ACG members to assist in areas related
to the manning, training, testing, and funding for MIFASS,
leaving the bulk of the day to day MIFASS development duties
to the major players.
The principle development activity (PDA) for the
MIFASS program was the Marine Corps Systems Program
Directorate (Code PD-70-42) located within the Department of
the Navy's Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR),
formerly the Naval Electronics Systems Command (NAVELEX).
(see Appendix B; for the purpose of this paper the PDA and
SPAWAR are synonymous) The mission of SPAWAR was to support
the Marine Corps by providing for the design, development,
integration, test and evaluation, and procurement of MIFASS
in order to satisfy operational requirements [Ref. 5,6].
The SPAWAR/USMC relationship was one in which SPAWAR
managers would receive guidance and direction from CMC, but
still reported to the Commander of SPAWAR. (see Appendix B)
The Marine Corps provided the funding and requirements for
MIFASS with SPAWAR chartered with the program management
responsibility [Ref. 5,6]. During development, SPAWAR,
DevCtr, and DC/S RD&S were required to maintain close
coordination. If production had commenced, SPAWAR would




The following is a summary of a MIFASS Chronology
written by Major John Cockle, USMC, MIFASS ASPO, in May
1986.
In 1972 the MIFASS requirement was validated on a MTACCS
test bed established at Marine Corps Tactical Systems
Support Activity (MCTSSA). By August 1975 a Required
Operational Capability was approved and published,
specifying the mission requirements for MIFASS.
March 1976 .
A special Marine Systems Acquisition Review Council
(MSARC) approved the advanced development of MIFASS using
both the FASC concept centralized and then current tactical
organization decentralized. It was further specified that
even though approval for testing of the FASC concept was
granted, it did not signify an approved change in current
Marine Corps tactical doctrine.
February 1977 .
The MSARC II convened and approved the full scale
development of a MIFASS engineering development model (EDM)




A special MSARC convened to obtain approval for the
continuation of the MIFASS program, and to gain approval for
fabricating a Marine Amphibious Brigade ( MAB ) sized EDM.
Norden Systems Incorporated, was awarded the EDM contract in
September 1979. At this time cost projections were:
R&D USMC PROCUREMENT
Cost: $71.44 million Funding: FY 1984
Time: 36 months IOC: March 1986
EDM Delivery: October 1982
July 1980 .
The ACMC committee met and established a requirement to
add a unit level message switch (ULMS) to the MIFASS EDM and
to increase MIFASS software documentation. Projected costs
at this time were:
R&D USMC PROCUREMENT
Cost: $92.04 million Funding: FY 1985
Time: 42 months IOC: September 1986
EDM Delivery: April 1983
December 1981 .
The ACMC committee was notified that Norden had problems
in meeting the April 1983 EDM delivery date due to
unforeseen complications in software changes, and the added
complexity of message text formats. The committee decided
to delete four MIFASS requirements and defer eight others
until a later date. A developmental delay of twelve months
was authorized. A study group was formed at this time,
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chaired by Major General D. B. Barker, DC/S for Training, to
review MIFASS requirements. Projected costs at this time:
R&D USMC PROCUREMENT
Cost: $158.14 million Funding: FY 1986
Time: 54 months IOC: September 1987
EDM Delivery: April 1984
May 1982 .
The Chief of Staff's committee reviewed the Barker
study. It was decided to continue testing of the EDM using
the FASC concept and then current tactical organization.
July-December 1982 .
An additional development cost of $10.5 million for the
interface software for the Digital Communications Terminal
(DCT), and PLRS was approved. This software was deemed
necessary to take advantage of PLRS location information. A
further expense of $1.5 million was also incurred for the
development software for a message distribution system. An
additional $2 million was spent to evaluate the suitability
of integrating MIFASS and TCO.
1 June 1983 .
The ACMC committee convened to review two ADMs:
1. Approval for the modification allowing a six month
extension for the EDM delivery date.
2. The requirement for ACMC approval prior to the
expenditure of more funds on MIFASS.
The decision was also made to conduct Operational Testing-II
(OT-II) using only current organizational tactics. The work
around for software changes was estimated at $3 million.
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April 1984 .
The ACMC committee assembled to accept Norden's proposal
for "Release 6" software improvement (Artillery Fire Plan/
Fire Plan execution functions) to be separated from the rest
of MIFASS software. Projected costs at this time:
R&D USMC PROCUREMENT
Cost: $172.22 million Funding: FY 1986
Time: 60 months IOC: April 1988
EDM Delivery: October 1984
July 1984 .
The ACMC committee met to discuss a five month EDM
extension due to the implementation of required software,
and to decide upon associated cost increases. A Norden
proposed 50/50 cost sharing arrangement for an estimated $13
million in software development, was approved. SPAWAR was
directed to negotiate a cap on development costs with the
contractor. Projected costs at this time:
R&D USMC PROCUREMENT
Cost: $187.47 million Funding: FY 1987
Time: 65 months IOC: FY 1988
EDM Delivery: March 1985
August 1984 .
The ACMC committee received notification that Norden had
rejected a cap on costs for MIFASS. It was agreed that
Norden would use $1 million of its own funds and that
"Release 6" software would be delivered with the EDM. No
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further government funding was provided. Projected costs at
this time:
R&D USMC PROCUREMENT
Cost: $188.64 million Funding: FY 1987
Time: 65 months IOC: FY 1988
EDM Delivery: March 1985
May 1985 .
The ACMC committee met to modify MIFASS acquisition
strategy. It was decided that a modified "Release 6"
software package be completed with full capability included
either in the MIFASS production model or in the preplanned
product improvement plan (PI). It was decided that the
delivery date of the system be extended thirteen months and
that the Marine Corps would allow $7 million more funds to
be expended. Projected costs at this time were:
R&D USMC PROCUREMENT
Cost: $201.88 million Funding: FY 1989
Time: 78 months IOC: 2nd Qtr, FY 1992
EDM Delivery: April 1986
At this time $52.18 million of the $201.88 million
total R&D cost had been absorbed by the contractor.
October 1985 .
The ACMC committee made three determinations:
1. The PDA was to develop an acquisition plan based on
competition for the MIFASS production contract.
2. The PDA was to develop a finite list of required
modifications.
3. The PDA was to complete a detailed R&D plan for MIFASS
by task and year.
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4. The PDA was to provide the pros and cons of MIFASS as
perceived by past and present First Marine Amphibious
Force Test Directors.
March 1986 .
The ACMC committee received a proposed improved
acquisition plan from the PDA. The finite list of required
modifications was presented totaling $19.8 million.
May 1986 .
A meeting chaired by the DC/S RD&S, including key ACG
members and contractor representatives, discussed the
contractor's efforts required to prepare the MIFASS EDM for
OT-II. Milestone III was anticipated in June 1987. [Ref. 7]
May 1987 .
The ACMC recommended to CMC the termination of MIFASS.
Total funds spent on MIFASS exceeded $236.08 million [Ref.
8].
NOTE: Monetary figures utilized in this chronology were
computed by taking current fiscal year dollars, and
converting to 1989 fiscal year dollars. Conversion
was accomplished by using weighted escalator
factors for 1989 dollars. A document with these
factors, dated 1 February 1987, was provided by
the Programming and Budget Branch DC/S RD&S, HQMC.
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III. MIFASS PROGRAM ANALYSIS
Chapter II identified the fact that MIFASS was a complex
system. In this analysis, three major problems have
surfaced as the fundamental weaknesses of the MIFASS
acquisition effort: a flawed acquisition strategy; poor
requirements determination; and weak program management.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze these problems in
greater depth and to examine the flawed MIFASS acquisition
strategy, to illustrate how MIFASS requirements were not
properly approached, and to show how the program management
structure exacerbated these problems.
A. FLAWED ACQUISITION STRATEGY
The Required Operational Capability (ROC), drafted in
1975, provided the statement of a Marine Corps need for
MIFASS. Defined in that document were such things as the
threat, operational deficiencies to be overcome, essential
performance requirements, interoperability and intraoper-
ability with other systems, and the concept of employment
for MIFASS. [Ref. 9] One key flaw of the ROC that caused
problems with the acquisition strategy and follow on
detailed requirements, was its emphasis on system
description rather than stating "required capabilities."
Because the sytem described in the ROC greatly exceeded the
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levels of detail and confidence normally available when a
ROC is initiated, a System Description Document (SDD) was
written as a follow-on, to specify more detailed system
requirements than were available when the ROC was written.
[Ref. 10]
According to Mr. Paul Mcllvaine, Director of the
Technical Management Department at the Defense Systems
Management College (DSMC), the initial MIFASS acquisition
strategy that was born from the 1975 ROC, had some basic
flaws that fostered later problems. As a civilian, and the
first APO for MIFASS, Mr. Mcllvaine was involved in many of
the day-to-day management decisions during the program
initiation.
It was Mcllvaine 's opinion that the formulation of a
MIFASS SDD following the establishment of the 1975 ROC, was
a non-standard occurrence in systems acquisition management.
The significance of the SDD was that it had been translated
directly into "Type A" specifications (which are initial
specifications) for hardware and software capabiltiies. This
process went unquestioned. In retrospect, it was thought
that MCTSSA, having conducted the initial concept
exploration for MIFASS, and being the organization closest
to the specifications requirements, should have written the
specifications. [Ref. 10]
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The impact of the "unscrubbed specs" on the overall
acquisition strategy, was that it may have affected the
MIFASS competitive definition (CD) phase. This occurred
when CD contracts were awarded to Norden Systems and Hughes
Aircraft Company as competitors for the follow on
Engineering Development Model (EDM). Mr. Mcllvaine,
believed that the pressures to provide competitive proposals
to the governement by these contractors rendered challenges
to certain key specifications politically and competitively
impossible. In other words, the contractors refrained from
questioning certain specifications to avoid appearing
unqualified to the government [Ref. 10]
B. THE REQUIREMENTS PROBLEM
As it transpired later, when Norden Systems won the
MIFASS CD phase, and began to develop the eventual EDM, the
major problem was with too many mandatory requirements for
the system software. Because a contractor/government
requirements analysis was not adequately conducted,
requirements were stuffed into specifications without a
realistic challenge as to why they were actually included.
[Ref. 10]
The FASC concept for MIFASS turned out to be one of
these software related issues, and was ultimately dubbed as
the "major perturbation" of the MIFASS program. From the
very beginning, there had been serious reservations
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concerning the FASC concept, by senior officers in the
Marine Corps. The CMC cover letter to the Chief of Naval
Material for the 1975 ROC stated that the ROC
. . .contains changes to current Marine Corps doctrine for
the control of fire and air support coordination. As these
questions have not been fully addressed within the Marine
Corps, the promulgation of this document should not be
construed as approval of doctrinal changes by the
Commandant of the Marine Corps. [Ref. 11]
It is the opinion of this paper that the question should
have been asked: "If this was not approved doctrine, why
include it as a required MIFASS operational capability?"
In the May 1976 Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM),
approval was granted for further testing of the FASC
concept. The ACMC, along with CMC, was still leaning
toward using the current decentralized approach to making
tactical decisions within the system, but decided to defer a
final decision on the subject until the MSARC II was held.
It also was considered that the equipment specified in the
1975 ROC could support both the FASC centralized and current
organizational decentralized structure [Ref. 12] In spite
of the fact that the 1975 ROC specified only the FASC
concept, the MSARC II held in February 1977 made the
determination that the EDM contract would develop and
implement both centralized and decentralized tactical
organizations. When Norden Systems won the competition for
the EDM project in August 1979, software development and
34
testing commenced until later events necessitated some major
changes [Ref. 13]
By December 1981, the ACMC committee recognized that
Norden's problems with schedule slippage and cost overruns
were becoming serious enough to entertain discussion of
MIFASS program termination. The committee directed that a
formal study group chaired by Major General D. B. Barker,
review the MIFASS requirements, determine its cost
effectiveness, and develop recommendations concerning the
continuation of the MIFASS program.
It should be noted that in 1979, a newer ROC was written
and approved, to supercede the 1975 MIFASS ROC. The 1979
ROC incorporated some relatively minor changes, but it was
this latest version that the "Barker Study" considered as a
flawed document. As part of the study's recommendation to
rewrite a major portion of the 1979 MIFASS ROC, one of the
most important issues addressed was the controversy
surrounding the implementation of the FASC concept. There
were four basic reasons why the study found the FASC concept
unacceptable:
1. The FASC was too highly centralized. . .the commander
would not be able to handle the volume of information.
2. MIFASS would be located at the Infantry Commander's
Tactical Combat Operations Center (TCO); this person
did not have the technical expertise to coordinate
artillery fire direction and close air support.
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3. It shifted too much of the task of tactical fire
direction away from the artillery units that were
designed to compute firing data.
4. The testing and development of tactics concurrent with
hardware and software development was improper. This
should have been done before the contract for the EDM
was awarded. [Ref. 14:pp. 20-21]
From a contracting and acquisition stand point, the
fourth reason became a major issue. The study elaborated
that the path chosen for EDM development would complicate
operational testing, making it difficult to discern whether
problems and deficiencies were attributable to systematic
or organizational considerations. It also estimated that
operational testing would be extended by at least six
months. Additionally, from a life cycle point of view,
2introducing a new C system along with major changes in
doctrinal and functional responsibilities would be most
disruptive. [Ref. 14:p. 13]
The study also cited a statistical cost and operational
analysis conducted by the Marine Corps Operations Analysis
Group ( MCOAG ) on MIFASS. This analysis was based on
simulations at 29 Palms California and the MTACCS test bed
at Camp Pendleton California. It indicated that there was
no statistical evidence that the MIFASS model operating
under the FASC concept, versus a model using the current
decentralized organizational form was appreciably faster.
It further showed that the proposed monetary savings through
a reduced manning level, would be negligible. [Ref. 14:Encl.
6-B-3]
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In May 1982, after reviewing the "Barker Study's"
findings, testing of the EDM was to continue using the
current organizational as well as the proposed centralized
FASC tactics [Ref. 15]. The ACMC committee chose not to
implement the study's recommendations because they required
major changes, and the belief at that time was that MIFASS
was only six months away from operational testing. It was
not foreseen that MIFASS would actually experience four more
years of delays. In December 1982, the Director of the
Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity
(MCOTEA) drafted a letter to the ACMC stating:
Comparative evaluation of MIFASS with the FASC concept
versus current organization, procedures, and equipment,
though possible, would not provide a basis on which to
draw very meaningful conclusions as to the viability of
one organization versus another organization. [Ref. 16]
The significance of this letter further substantiated the
"Barker Study's" conviction that organizational issues
needed to be separated from the development of the MIFASS
EDM. Furthermore, given both MCOTEA ' s and the "Barker
Study's" concurrent evaluation of the FASC concept, any
consideration of a mission requirement change of this
magnitude, should have forced MIFASS to a MSARC II repeat.
Because of MCOTEA 's report, and based on recommendations
from DirC4SysDiv (the APS), an ADM dated 17 May 1983 was
approved and issued. It stated that the "design and test
documentation for the EDM must be modified to utilize
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only current organizational tactics" [Ref . 17]. It was
envisioned that a software "work around" would result in
only a three month slippage in development testing, with the
time gained back during a shortened operational testing
period. Correcting the original software to accommodate
just the current tactical organization, required that Norden
Systems change up to a quarter of the software coding for
the EDM (approximately 160,000 lines of coding), estimated
at a cost of three million dollars. [Ref. 13]
In addition to finding fault with the FASC concept, the
"Barker Study" found many other deficiencies with the 1979
MIFASS ROC. These deficiencies included a need for an
updated threat statement, improved interoperability
capabilities, and the fact that the mobility and
transportability of such a huge system was difficult. The
study provided a "1982 Proposed ROC" to incorporate its
recommendations and conclusions, but it was never approved.
[Ref. 14: End 5] Even after the FASC requirement for the
EDM was changed in 1983, a new ROC was never approved, and
the 1979 ROC continued to be in effect until the MIFASS
program was terminated in June 1987.
C. OTHER REQUIREMENT SPECIFIC PROBLEMS
Conceptually the basic issue that the Marine Corps
precipitated with the establishment of MIFASS requirements,
was that it thought it knew what was needed in order to
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follow the structure of the MTACCS Test Bed. The Dynamic
Situation Display (DSD), mentioned in the 1975 and 1979
ROCs, was a direct outgrowth from the test bed. The
difficulty with the philosophy of making such a specific
requirement, was that detailed specifications were generated
which left the contractor with little design latitude. It
minimized the incentive for the contractor to use his own
initiative to create software/hardware concepts that may
have been more satisfactory. The bottom line was that the
ROC was misused and should not have directed a specific
solution. It should have carefully stated what capabilities
the Marine Corps needed. The question about an MSARC again
arises, because theoretically these problems should have
been discovered during MSARC proceedings. [Ref. 4]
The requirements for MIFASS intraoperability within
MTACCS made it extremely complicated and dependent
on schedule completions. It was apparent that the Marine
Corps did not carefully follow through on MTACCS as the
larger program, of which MIFASS was only a part. Examples
of this were the hardware and software applications that
MIFASS depended on from TCO. Indications are that not much
thought was given to the fact that the Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) planned for MIFASS was fiscal year 1986,
while the TCO was scheduled for 1988 [Ref. 14:p. 4].
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Combined with these problems of intraoperability, was
the communications architecture that MTACCS was to operate
within called the Landing Force Integrated Communication
System (LFICS). This architecture was designed to provide
secure digital communications. Many of the MIFASS
capabilities were "slaved" to this proposed system, but
LFICS, and the digital communications equipment required to
support those capabilities never came to fruition. Various
development programs for LFICS were either slipped or
terminated, the result being that MIFASS did not have the
supporting communications equipment that it was designed to
work with [Ref. 4].
Besides the intraoperability difficulties, another area
where MIFASS had problems, was providing for the automation
of unit level tactical artillery fire direction and the
abiltiy to interoperate with U. S. Army artillery systems.
Because the Marine Corps could not count on having the
required volume of naval gunfire support during an
amphibious operation, heavy reliance would be placed on
various artillery weapons and ammunition combinations.
Additionally, with the deferred requirement to interoperate
with the Army's Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE), it
was decided in 1984 to buy the Army's Battery Computer
System ( BCS ) as a stop gap measure. [Ref. 4] BCS had a
character oriented message (COM) format while MIFASS was a
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bit oriented message (BOM) system. Additionally, BCS was
designed to operate with the more decentralized TACFIRE
system while MIFASS was never intended to have a
decentralized unit level computer. Again more time and
money would have been required to construct a "work around"
to incorporate BCS with MIFASS. This would have involved
changing 30,000 lines of code at an estimated cost of nine
million dollars. [Ref. 4]
D. MIFASS PROGRAM MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
1. The PDA
The Commandant of the Marine Corps held the
authority to assign a Program Manager (PM), approve a
charter, and establish a Program Management Office (PMO) to
be the primary advocate for MIFASS [Ref. 2]. The question
has been asked many times why this was not accomplished.
It seems only two explanations can be provided for this,
despite policy guidance from the Office of Management and
Budget, Circular Number A-109, which advises that government
agencies procuring new major systems must "establish clear
lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability for
management of major system acquisition programs."
The first reason may have been the perception that
past arrangements that incorporated ACGs, NAVELEX (later
SPAWAR), and HQMC as key figures, had provided an ample
management structure. Secondly, Marine Corps specific
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programs had historically been relatively simple. For the
more complex procurements such as aircraft and other major
weapons, "piggyback" buys had been utilized in concert with
other service's programs. With these types of arrangements,
often times a Marine PMO was not justified. Additionally,
the fact that the Marine Corps had always stressed that it
was part of the Department of the Navy when it came to
systems acquisitions, gave Marine Corps specific programs
less visibility. [Ref. 10]
Technically SPAWAR was chartered as the PMO, with
the Marine Corps Systems Program Directorate holding the
title as PM. As such this activity should have been the
primary advocate for MIFASS. However, SPAWAR was never
required to do such things as testify before Congress
regarding funding. This was because SPAWAR did not have a
direct involvement in the Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting ( PPBS ) process. An example of this was during the
development of MIFASS, when the DPO was expected to take
funding received from SPAWAR and report to the Acquisition
Program Sponsor (APS: DirC SysDiv) how it was expended. Then
the APS, not SPAWAR, would act as a supplemental witness
with the DC/S RD&S when testifying before Congress. [Ref. 4]
Offices involved with MIFASS had to depend on a
somewhat informal matrix organization. A matrix is any
organization that utilizes a "multiple command system" which
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"includes not only a multiple command structure but also
related support mechanisms" [Ref. 18:p.3]. This structure
was informal because there was not a specific individual, in
the form of a program manager (PM), who was chartered, and
singularly responsible to HQMC for the technical and
business/financial management for MIFASS. A good matrix
organization would have enforced stricter accountability
than was present with the MIFASS program.
As was the case with SPAWAR, there was no guarantee
that information passed within this informal matrix would be
used. The intuitive belief at the beginning of MIFASS was
that everyone involved was a Marine, that Marines
traditionally worked together, and there was not a
requirement to formalize a strong relationship between HQMC
and NAVELEX (SPAWAR). The result of this was the informal
matrix arrangement that appeared in the PM charter for
NAVELEX (SPAWAR). [Ref. 10]
In defense of SPAWAR, it was the responsibility of
HQMC to make the ultimate decision on exactly how MIFASS
would be managed. The nature of the informal matrix
organization is as much a reason for MIFASS problems as
anything else. This matrix combined with the many complex
requirements contributed significantly to the difficulties
of MIFASS program management.
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2. The ACG
From the standpoint of the ACG, the day-to-day
management by committee of MIFASS had its own peculiar
problems. The ASPO would sometimes have difficulty getting
all the essential members to attend, just because some
persons did not seem to believe it was their job. For
example, representatives from DC/S for Training and Manpower
indicated it was their assignment only to evaluate, and not
to build manning and training requirements for MIFASS,
indicates that the distribution of responsibilities had not
been defined or understood. [Ref. 13]
Management by committee also made it difficult to
gain a fair consensus on certain issues. The situation of
short funding, and the APO responsible for logistics, is an
example. Situations arose where "Logistics" was short on
some issues that were critical to that portion of the
program. This would happen as a result of being on the
minority side of a critical vote [Ref. 13]. Additionally,
every member on the ACG had his own independent chain of
command, thus enabling the responsibility and solutions for
potentially key issues, to be divided up or approached with
different goals in mind [Ref. 8]
.
As problems increased with MIFASS, the ACMC and his
committee actually assumed much of the overall program
supervision from the APS. Every major decision on MIFASS
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ultimately ended in the committee's hands. Some former ACG
members expressed their opinion that decisions made by this
committee were not always sound. For example, the update of
the Fire Plan/ Fire Plan Execution Function software (going
from Release 5 to Release 6) received a negative
recommendation from the ACG to the ACMC committee. It was
the conviction of the ACG that Norden Systems would not be
able to meet its ambitious update schedule. However,
Norden officials performed an "end around" maneuver of the
ACG. Corporate representatives actually lobbied the ACMC
committee in-person, and won approval for the necessary
contract modifications. Subsequently Norden did experience
schedule problems, and failed to deliver the software
modification on time. [Ref. 13]
Foremost on the list of problems for ACG
members was the lack of experience and formal education in
the acquisition and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting
(PPBS) process. When the last MIFASS ASPO assumed his
position he was given only a two day class on PPBS, and a
half day at Marine Corps Installations and Logistics (I&L)
on Marine Corps peculiar budgeting procedures. These two
and a half days constituted what was up to that time, his
total experience in those areas. [Ref. 13]
Finally, because the Marine Corps had not stressed a
strong acquisition program for C systems, very few
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individuals who over the years had held key MIFASS
management positions, ever received formal acquisition
training. Schooling such as the Program Manager's course at
the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC), historically
has had few Marine Corps graduates. This combined with the
fact that individuals rotated out of their jobs every three
to four years, tended to hamper program stability and delay
the development process. [Refs. 10, 13]
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IV. DISCUSSION
Chapter III outlines critical flaws that were prevalent
during the MIFASS Program. Given those examples, it is the
opinion of this author that when MIFASS was initiated, the
Marine Corps was still not totally committed to the program.
This is documented by the cover letter for the 1975 ROC to
the Chief of Naval Material, and follow-on ADMs related
to that ROC. These documents indicated early on that there
was considerable doubt in the minds of senior Marine Corps
officials about the critical issue of what Marine Corps
tactical doctrine MIFASS would support. There was a need
for a decision on this issue from the beginning, but
apparently senior level interest was not there, nor were
the necessary managerial resources dedicated until the
program was in serious trouble.
It is a conclusion of this paper that the overall
management of MIFASS had flaws that were borne out of this
lack of organizational support. The remainder of this
chapter will discuss how this lack of organizational support




A. FLAWED MATRIX ORGANIZATION
It appears that there was a heavy reliance on an
informal matrix organization supporting the MIFASS program.
Arrangements for responsibility should have been explicitly
established, and provided a more approximate agreement on
who was to accomplish specific tasks.
As MIFASS evolved, the ACMC and his committee gradually
assumed the duties of what normally would be considered a
PMO. The effect was however, that it did not provide for
the daily technical management required for MIFASS.
Instead, a single full time program manager should have been
chartered who coordinated with all key personnel on a
regular basis, in order to facilitate important decisions.
Secondly, the concept of management by committee caused
a great deal of inefficiency and a loss of effectiveness.
Most of the key decisions were hammered out in group
meetings. It appears that many of the MIFASS Program
decisions incorporated detailed matters in which only
several individuals were intimately familiar. Yet the
entire committee (the ACG and the ACMC committees) had to
listen to the issues being discussed and were expected to
participate in and influence decisions.
Some of the individuals in these committees may have
enjoyed a steady diet of meetings, but a larger number of
people may have felt that their time was wasted, and could
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have been better utilized by working in their specialty
areas. Again, the cure for this problem would have been the
placement of a single PM who understood how a matrix
organization was to function. He would then be able
to monitor and draw the line between individual and
committee matters [Ref. 18:p. 134].
Thirdly, it appears that the MIFASS Program may have
suffered from "decision strangulation" [Ref. 18:p. 138].
All issues had to be cleared through at least two committees
(The ACG and ACMC committees) before decisions were
finalized. This arrangement required each ACG member to
have a functional boss, whom he reported to before the ACG
met. Reviews then had to be tabled until specialists
cleared specific matters with their functional bosses, in




Previous chapters have described in detail three major
areas that ultimately doomed the MIFASS program:
1. Poor requirements definition;
2. Flawed matrix organization;
3. Problems with interoperability and intraoperability
with other systems.
It is this author's conclusion that some form of a "Marine
Systems Command" dedicated to program management, would in
the future go a long way toward averting future problems.
This command should incorporate the necessary managerial
support for acquiring equipment within Marine Corps mission
areas, to include systems like MIFASS.
A systems command organized into various divisions, to
include a C division, would allow the "pooling" of
experienced acquisition professionals. This would enable
experts the ability to dedicate themselves in making
intelligent and precise decisions when defining required
operation capabilities.
Secondly, the establishment of such a command, would
help to avoid the "flawed matrix" problems of the MIFASS
program. This command would require assigning the necessary
contracting, engineering, and business/financial support for
Marine systems from SPAWAR. The reason for this is to get
all support for future C systems under one organization.
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During research for this paper, the author encountered a
good deal of "finger pointing" and blaming between SPAWAR
and members of the ACG. MIFASS was complex enough without
incorporating the somewhat adversarial "we-they" attitude
that seemed to exist within the MIFASS program. The
presence of this type of conflict may have contributed to
some of the difficulties experienced with MIFASS.
Finally, once a systems command is established, a
program management structure could be designed to draw the
necessary support required, while at the same time,
coordinating development with other concurrent programs.
The most likely solution for establishing a good MIFASS
management structure would have been to start with a program
director ( PD ) for MTACCS. Answering to this person would be
various PMs for the programs within MTACCS, to include
MIFASS. The Navy Program Manager's Guide cited the
Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.1, which stated that
a PD must be designated over several PMs for programs within
a particular warfare or mission area. It further stated
that a PD was to be a line authority, and that no PM should
be responsible to more than two levels of line authority.
[Ref. 19]
Since MTACCS was a grouping of C functional areas, the
logical office to assume the PD responsibility would reside
in a related division located within the proposed "Marine
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Corps Systems Command." A chartered PM for MIFASS,
reporting directly to the PD, would have streamlined the
flow of information and decreased the difficulty in
accounting for various phases of the program. The PM acting
as the primary advocate for MIFASS could then be the single
point of contact for all MIFASS related activities, to
include responsibility for the exercise of the technical and
business/financial management for the program.
52















( PLRS ] ( TAOC
7 MIFASS)
-85]




1 RCDC ] / MAGIS j
MIFASS EDM 1986
[ PLRS ) (MIFASS
J
EDM - Engineering Development Model
MAGIS - Marine Air-Ground Intelligence Svstem
MIFASS - Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System
MTACCS - Marine Tactical Command and Control System
NTDS - Naval Tactical Data System
PLRS - Position Location Reportinq System
TAOC-85 - Tactical Air Operations Central-1985
TACFIRE - Tactical Fire Direction System (ARMY)
RCDC - Radar Course Directory Central
ROC - Required Operational Capability
53
APPENDIX B MIFASS PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION [Ref. 4]
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